Letter From Brussels: They are dreaming of regime change in Hungary

Political hysteria afflicts the European Parliament

  MEP’s on a mission

I had to take a reality check when I read the resolution on Hungary passed by the European Parliament on 24 November. The resolution was not confined to the usual condemnation of the Hungarian Government. In all but name, it was arguing for a soft policy of regime change!

 

As expected, the resolution welcomed the measures enacted by the European Commission designed to punish Hungary. In particular, it praised the Commission for triggering the Conditionality Regulation that freezes EU funds that were earmarked for Hungary.

 

As far as the MEPs supporting the resolution were concerned, the Commission had not gone far enough. They complained that the proposal to trigger the Conditionality Regulation against Hungary was long overdue and should have been far tougher. The resolution stated that the Commission’s proposal was ‘too limited’ in scope. In other words, more severe punishment is needed to teach the Hungarian Government a lesson.

 

That the EU Parliament is on a mission to force the Hungarian Government into a corner is not surprising. Many Members of the European Parliament regard the values and policies promoted by the Hungarian Government as antithetical to their outlook. Some go so far as to claim that the traditional values espoused by Hungary are inconsistent with membership in the EU. Their hatred for the Hungarian Government is also enhanced by the conviction that its actions and behaviour set an example for other European dissident voices to follow. MEPs who are wedded to the technocratic and social engineering outlook of the EU oligarchy fear that Hungary’s example will embolden movements they characterise as populists. It is their dread of populism that explains the peculiar form of political hysteria that these MEPs direct at Hungary.

 

What is truly significant about the resolution passed by the EU Parliament was that it unapologetically called on the EU to bypass the Hungarian Government and disperse funds to sympathetic allies in Hungary. The resolution stated that the final recipients of EU funds in Hungary should not lose out and that this can be achieved by bypassing the national government and handing out the money to friendly local institutions. The resolution advocates using local government and NGOs in Hungary to distribute EU funds. That’s another way of saying that the EU should encourage establishing parallel state institutions through which the funds should be dispersed. The main merit of this approach from the standpoint of its supporters is that it not only punishes the Hungarian Government but also rewards its domestic allies.

For some time, the EU oligarchy has relied on a large and dense network of NGOs to outsource political decision-making. It often uses NGOs and their supposed expertise to promote its policies. The public relations image of NGOs as independent and politically neutral and disinterested serves to legitimate the policies they promote. In reality, NGOs are neither disinterested nor neutral. They are not even really non-governmental. Many of them are funded either directly or indirectly by governments. According to the EU Commission’s Financial Transparency System, in 2021, the EU dished out 10 billion euros to NGOs and Non-profit organisations, roughly 6 per cent of its budget. The EU also committed 252 million euros to fund Hungarian NGOs and Non-profit organisations.

If one were to dig deeper, one would likely find that NGOs have been recipients of even more EU funding.

The preference of the European Parliament for Hungarian NGOs over a democratically elected government is informed by the aim of weakening and even destabilising it. The European Parliament regards these NGOs as a medium through which it gains influence over the conduct of public life in this nation. If NGOs got their hands on EU funds, it would put them in a position to decide how the money would be distributed. EU parliamentarians hope that, in this way, they can establish a network of trusted local collaborators who could be relied on to promote its interests and values. They believe that, at least indirectly, the funnelling of money through NGOs could also strengthen the position of the political opposition to the Hungarian Government.

The goal of regime change motivates opponents of the Hungarian Government to weaponise the EU’s mechanism for distributing funding to member states. There are precedents for relying on economic blackmail to impose the EU’s policy on member states.

During the 2011 Eurozone crisis, the EU Commission unapologetically intervened in the domestic affairs of Greece and Italy. The ease with which Lucas Papademos was appointed Prime Minister of Greece and Mario Monti as the head of Italy’s government was testimony to the effectiveness of the EU’s administrative fiat.  At the time, European Commission President José Manuel Barroso explained the necessity of over-riding local decision-making in the following terms: The non-democratically appointed governments of Italy and Greece have been installed ‘not just because they’re technocrats, but because it [is] easier to ask independent personalities to construct political consensus.’ Barroso did not need to spell out what these ‘personalities’ were independent of since it was evident that their main virtue was that they were independent of their electorates. For Barroso, effective policymaking meant minimising the distractions thrown up by the process of public accountability.

Mario Monti personified the so-called independent technocrat who could serve as viceroy of Brussels. Mario Monti, a former EU commissioner, was appointed to replace Berlusconi. This EU-inspired coup was orchestrated with the help of the President of Italy, Giorgio Napolitano. Formerly a leading member of the Italian Communist Party, Napolitano played a key role in preparing the way for the coup. He schemed to have Monti appointed as senator for life so that he could become a ‘legitimate’ prime minister a week later. It is worth noting that Monti’s government did not include a single elected politician. A government of notables and experts is the kind of regime that draws praise from the EU Commission.

Thankfully there is no Hungarian equivalent of a Giorgio Napolitano who can implement the dictates of Brussels. It is wishful thinking rather than realpolitik that underpins the project of relying on NGOs to act as representatives of Brussels in Budapest. If the European Parliament were to impose a financial penalty on Hungary, it could negatively impact the quality of life of its people. However, weaponising the EU’s funding mechanism is not without a high cost to everyone concerned. Once the distribution of funds is subordinated to political calculations, the probity of the EU’s financial arrangement is put into question. Once the common fund becomes subordinated to narrow party-political calculations, it becomes evident that the integrity of EU institutions is in trouble.